Max R. P. Grossmann

Home

Max R. P. Grossmann

Welcome! I am Max, a doctoral student in economics at the University of Cologne, specializing in the behavioral foundations of political economy. I am on the 2024–2025 academic job market (worldwide). My research uses experimental and survey methods to address questions such as:

  • How do we create formal rules? When do we respect others’ choices?
  • How do the mental models of policymakers manifest in policy?
  • What shapes public support for controversial policies?

I am also an expert programmer and keen user of open-source software. My research sometimes employs advanced methods, including large language models and computational economics.

Knowledge and Freedom: Evidence on the Relationship Between Information and Paternalism

Job Market Paper

I run simple experiments to see how a decision-maker’s knowledge affects the freedom others give them. If people know what they’re doing, others interfere less with their choices. A safe option is more likely to be imposed. Policymakers understand that decision-maker mistakes can work in their favor.
#paternalism #experiment #microtheory

Download paper Share paper

When is autonomy granted to a decision-maker based on their knowledge, and if no autonomy is granted, what form will the intervention take? A parsimonious theory shows how policymakers can exploit decision-maker mistakes and use them as a justification for intervention. In two experiments, policymakers (“Choice Architects”) can intervene in a choice faced by a decision-maker. We vary the amount of knowledge decision-makers possess about the choice. Full decision-maker knowledge causes more than a 60\% reduction in intervention rates. Beliefs have a small, robust correlation with interventions on the intensive margin. Choice Architects disproportionately prefer to have decision-makers make informed decisions. Interveners are less likely to provide information. As theory predicts, the same applies to Choice Architects who believe that decision-maker mistakes align with their own preference. When Choice Architects are informed about the decision-maker’s preference, this information is used to determine the imposed option. However, Choice Architects employ their own preference to a similar extent. A riskless option is causally more likely to be imposed, being correlated with but conceptually distinct from Choice Architects' own preference. This is a qualification to what has been termed “projective paternalism.”

Listen to a quick summary (generated by NotebookLM):
Curriculum Vitae

Up-to-date CV with my academic and professional experience.

View Download
Research

Details for my research interests and projects.

View Research statement
Have me apply at your institution

If you believe I could be a good fit for your institution, use this form.

Notify me
Contact me

Get in touch.

E-mail Signal Call me
WiSo Workplace Video

Experience

Currently, I manage the Cologne Laboratory for Economic Research, one of the largest experimental economics laboratories. I was an Oskar Morgenstern Fellow at the Mercatus Center at George Mason University.

Technology

Among other things, I developed otree_slider and alter_ego.

Events